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ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL FOR
UNIVERSAL DISARMAMENT OF
AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS OR
HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING
AND LOVE THE KILLER ROBOT
INTRODUCTION
ethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)
1
have re-
cently become the subject of debate among scholars, world
leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the popu-
lar media.
2
While the dangers of autonomous robotics have ex-
isted for decades in science fiction,
3
technology has only recently
made the implementation of robots capable of military combat a
real possibility.
4
With the advent of this technology, however,
many government leaders, politicians, scientists, and business
leaders are advancing the argument that just because autono-
mous weapons can exist does not mean they should.
5
1. LAWS are weapons systems capable of identifying targets and using
deadly force without human control. These devices have also referred to as au-
tonomous weapons systems, autonomous military systems, lethal autonomous
robotics, and “killer robots.” U.S. DEP’T. DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.09, AUTONOMY
IN WEAPON SYSTEMS (2017); PATRICK LIN ET AL., AUTONOMOUS MILITARY
ROBOTICS: RISK, ETHICS, AND DESIGN (2008); Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47
(2013);Home, CAMPAIGNSTOPKILLERROBOTS, http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/
(last visited Oct. 7, 2018); Samuel Gibs, Elon Musk Leads 116 Experts Calling
for Outright Ban of Killer Robots, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/20/elon-musk-killer-ro-
bots-experts-outright-ban-lethal-autonomous-weapons-war.
2. See Gibs, supra note 1; Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts
on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), CCW/GGE.1/2017/CRP.1
(Nov. 17, 2017).
3. See, e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 17, 20 (Street & Smith,
1942), available at http://kaitnieks.com/files/asimov_isaac__i_robot.pdf
(demonstrating a fear of killer robots in 1942); TERMINATOR (Pacific Western
Productions 1984); I, ROBOT (20
th
Century Fox 2004).
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY THE CASE AGAINST KILLER
ROBOTS (2012).
5. An open letter published by the future life institute calling for the pro-
hibition of LAWS has been signed by Tesla and SpaceX founder, Elon Musk,
as well as renowned theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking. Autonomous
Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers, FUTURE LIFE
INSTITUTE (July 28, 2015), https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-
weapons/.
L
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The purpose of this Note is twofold. First, it examines the use
of human-out-of-the-loop weapons, robotics technology, and au-
tonomy in order to predict how states will react to the prospect
of banning autonomous weapons. Second, this Note proposes
that the creation of a new framework agreement on LAWS and
the formation of a new international organization tasked with
developing and implementing LAWS regulations would be favor-
able compromise to interested parties. Part I briefly details the
history of unmanned weapons and the recent development of ro-
botics and autonomy in military technology. Part II summarizes
some of the most popular arguments advanced by proponents
and critics of autonomous weapons. Part III analyzes successful
multilateral disarmament treaties in order to ascertain whether
universal disarmament of robotic weapons is likely to occur. Fi-
nally, Part IV considers the interests of states in developing ro-
botic weapons and proposes that effective disarmament of au-
tonomous weapons would require the creation of an immediate
binding agreement. Such an agreement would initially be per-
missive in allowing research and development of LAWS, but
would resolve to continue to further regulate LAWS over time
through the establishment of a permanent international organ-
ization. This proposal argues that the only effective method of
reducing the use of autonomous weapons is through a multilat-
eral treaty. Because universal disarmament of all autonomous
weapons is unlikely, the only practical solution is to permit their
use, but with regulations that are designed and implemented in
tandem with the incremental development and implementation
of LAWS.
6
I. A BRIEFHISTORY OFUNMANNEDWEAPONS, ROBOTICS, AND
AUTONOMY INWAR
This Part describes the historic use of unmanned weapons in
armed conflicts and tracks the development of unmanned weap-
ons through the recent use of human-in-the-loop and human-on-
the-loop systems.
7
This Part also addresses the most recent
6. See KENNETH ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, LAW AND ETHICS FOR
AUTONOMOUSWEAPONS SYSTEMS: WHY A BANWON’TWORK AND HOW THE LAWS
OFWARCAN 2 (2013) (describing the “incremental” development of LAWS).
7. Human-in-the-Loop Weapons are “[r]obots that can select targets and
deliver force only with a human command;” Human-on-the-Loop Weapons are
“[r]obots that can select targets and deliver force under the oversight of a hu-
man operator who can override the robots’ actions;” and Human-out-of-the-
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projections for potential uses of autonomous weapons and out-
of-the-loop systems in combat and discusses the legal mecha-
nisms that currently restrict the use of LAWS.
A. Unmanned Weapons in War
Before discussing the potential dangers and advantages of the
most modern pieces of unmanned warfighting technology, it may
be helpful to recall the use of unmanned weapons in the past.
Introducing robots into the battlefield is seen by some as a
means of removing human soldiers from dangerous situations,
8
an objective which has been pursued in the past through the use
of booby traps and land mines.
9
The function of these devices has
primarily been defensive³a combatant would place mines to
target enemies advancing on a position or to force the enemy into
a more favorable position.
10
The American Civil War saw the first large-scale use of explo-
sive booby traps and land mines, and their use continued to grow
until the late twentieth century.
11
During the Vietnam War, the
North Vietnamese used a variety of booby traps to kill or inca-
pacitate enemy soldiers without placing their own troops at
risk.
12
Through the United Nations (U.N.) and NGOs’ significant
involvement, however, the use of mines in warfare has since
been greatly limited by the Convention on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects (CCW)
13
and the Ottawa Convention, which
Loop Weapons are “[r]obots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering
force without any human input or interaction.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 4.
8. Jeremy Rabkin & John Yoo, ¶Killer Robots’ Can Make War Less Awful,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/killer-robots-can-
make-war-less-awful-1504284282.
9. See Mathew Bolton, Thomas Nash, & Richard Moyes, Ban Autonomous
Armed Robots, ARTICLE 36 (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.article36.org/state-
ments/ban-autonomous-armed-robots/; U.S. MARINE CORPS, PROFESSIONAL
KNOWLEDGE GAINED FROM OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM, 1969,
SPECIAL ISSUE, MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS 1 (1989).
10. Id. at 3.
11. GARYD. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 736 (2nd ed. 2010).
12. U.S. MARINECORPS, supra note 9.
13. The CCW is a multilateral treaty which seeks to reduce or restrict the
use of specific weapons which cause superfluous injury or have indiscriminate
effect. The protocols of this treaty restrict the use of non-detectable fragments,
mines, boobytraps, incendiary weapons, and blinding laser weapons.
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prohibits party states from using anti-personnel land mines in
war.
14
Nevertheless, the use of mines is not universally prohib-
ited,
15
and countries, such as the United States, Russia, Israel,
China, and South Korea have been reluctant to agree to new re-
strictions.
16
In recent history, militaries have begun utilizing human-in-
the-loop systems, which are robotic systems that can engage en-
emies only through human command.
17
These systems take the
form of land, sea, and air vehicles that require a remote opera-
tor.
18
Weaponized unmanned ground vehicles, such as the iRobot
Packbot and the TALONS SWORDS platform used by the
United States and Australia in military activity in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, are remotely operated robots, capable of delivering
lethal and non-lethal assaults.
19
Unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs), such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, used by
the U.S. Air Force have similarly been used to remotely target
suspected terrorists.
20
Despite strong opposition to this practice,
the use of remotely operated weapons is likely to remain a part
of modern warfare.
21
The current state of weapons technology is difficult to assess
due to the swift rate of advancement and secrecy of military
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.
14. The Ottawa Convention is a multilateral agreement which prohibits
states from using, producing, and stockpiling anti-personnel mines. Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction art. 1, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211.
15. The Ottawa convention’s strict prohibition applies only to anti-person-
nel mines and has not been ratified by key states. Id. Sara Schmitt, The Ottawa
Convention: Signatories and States-Parties, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawasigs (last updated Jan. 2018).
16. Id.
17. Human-in-the-loop systems require a human command to deliver force,
in contrast to human-on-the-loop systems, which can select and engage targets
under human oversight or human-out-of-the-loop systems, which require no
human interaction to select and engage targets. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra
note 4.
18. Hin-Yan Liu, Categorization and Legality of Autonomous and Remote
Weapons, 94 INT’LREV. RED CROSS 627, 631 (2012).
19. RONALD ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS
12 (2009).
20. Liu, supra note 18, at 631.
21. Id.
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activity.
22
The introduction of autonomous systems, as well as
the implementation of states’ domestic guidelines on autono-
mous weapons, however, indicates a clear trend towards in-
creased weapon autonomy.
23
The United States, for example,
has increased spending on unmanned weapons from $4.5 billion
USD in fiscal year 2017 to $7.5 billion USD in 2018.
24
Without
intervention, the United States and other states will likely con-
tinue to develop and implement autonomous weapons.
25
LAWS have been given the following description:
robotic weapon systems that, once activated, can select and en-
gage targets without further intervention by a human opera-
tor. The important element is that the robot has an autono-
mous ¶choice’ regarding selection of a target and the use of le-
thal force.
26
States, however, have declined to reach consensus on an inter-
nationally accepted definition of LAWS or the extent to which
autonomy currently exists in weapons systems.
27
Currently, the
weapons with the most autonomy are primarily defensive in na-
ture and do not employ lethal force.
28
For instance, the Phalanx
weapons system, a weapon designed to autonomously target and
destroy incoming missiles, is used by the United States to pro-
tect ships and bases.
29
Israel’s Harpy UAV drone autonomously
detects and destroys radar emitters.
30
The South Korean
22. Id. at 630.
23. Id. at 632; see also Heather Roff, Weapons Autonomy is Rocketing,
FOREIGN POL’Y MAG. (Sept. 28, 2016), http://foreignpol-
icy.com/2016/09/28/weapons-autonomy-is-rocketing/; PABLO KALZMANOVITZ,
Judgement Liability and the Risks of Riskless Warfare, in AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 137, 147 (Nehal Bhuta et al. eds., 2016).
24. Brian K. Hall, Autonomous Weapons Safety, 86 JOINT FORCE Q. 86, 88
(2017); DANGETTINGER, SUMMARY OFDRONE SPENDING IN THEFY2019DEFENSE
BUDGET REQUEST, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THEDRONE AT BARD (2018).
25. Liu, supra note 18, at 634.
26. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 7; Cf. U.S. DEP’T. DEF., supra note 1; HUMAN
RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 2 (applying similar definitions).
27. Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2.
28. American Society of International Law (asil1906), Autonomous Wea-
ponry and Armed Conflict, YOUTUBE 39:00 (Apr. 10, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=duq3DtFJtWg.
29. Hall, supra note 24 at 89.
30. Harpy NG, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, http://www.iai.co.il/2013/36694-
16153-en/Business_Areas_Land.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2017).
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military uses an autonomous gun, the SGR-1s, which can auton-
omously identify enemies in the DMZ.
31
Although the weapon
requires a human command to fire,
32
some reports say it can be
programmed to autonomously make the decision to fire at tar-
gets.
33
Though not yet used in combat, states are quickly pursuing
offensive autonomous weapons, which could enter the battlefield
and selectively engage targets.
34
The United States, for example,
is currently developing nano drones, which could use hive mind
technology to perform offensive operations.
35
B. Applicable Humanitarian Law
While there is no existing international law specifically ad-
dressing the use of human-out-of-the-loop systems, some critics
of the technology argue that existing principles of international
humanitarian law (IHL) support the proposition that LAWS
should be banned.
36
The most analogous legal obligation stems
from the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,
which restricts the use of land mines, booby traps and “other de-
vices.”
37
The phrase “other devices” is likely not broad enough,
however, to include LAWS and has never been interpreted to do
so.
38
Other legal obligations that LAWS are said to violate are the
general principles of discrimination and proportionality, which
are fundamental to humanitarian law.
39
Human Rights Watch
31. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 13²14.
32. Id.
33. Id. ARKIN, supra note 19, at 167.
34. Gjert Lage Dynda, Tor Arne Berntsen & Sigrid Redse-Johansen, Auton-
omous Military Drones: No Longer Science Fiction, NATO REV. (July 28, 2017),
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/autonomous-military-
drones-no-longer-science-fiction/EN/index.htm.
35. Id.
36. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 30²36 (suggesting that the use
of LAWS would violate humanitarian law, a set of international rules govern-
ing the use of force, by breaching rules of distinction, proportionality, military
necessity, and the Martens Clause).
37. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, supra note 13, art. 2.
38. Id. (“¶Other devices’ means manually-emplaced munitions and devices
designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated by remote control or
automatically after a lapse of time.”).
39. KALZMANOVITZ, supra note 23, at 145.
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has taken the position that, if LAWS were permitted to be intro-
duced into the battlefield, there would be no ability to ensure
proper discrimination of targets and proportionality of military
activity.
40
Similar to the Convention, however, the argument
that LAWS violate general principles of humanitarian law is dif-
ficult to advance authoritatively due to the newness of the tech-
nology.
41
Because the technology of LAWS is so new, it is difficult
to make an accurate assessment of their ability to discriminate
targets, or the extent to which they might be considered inhu-
mane.
42
The United States has implemented domestic policy restrict-
ing the use and development of LAWS in Department of Defense
Directive 3000.09, which requires “appropriate levels of human
judgement over the use of force.”
43
This policy has been criti-
cized, however, for being vague.
44
Under this directive, the
United States could use LAWS without human supervision
when military necessity requires it to do so.
45
Furthermore, the
directive lacks the precedence of international law norms, and
may be altered by the United States.
46
Similar restrictions have
also been unilaterally adopted by other states throughout the
world.
47
Without existing international law directly and expressly pro-
hibiting the use of LAWS, a legal void exists, generating uncer-
tainty.
48
The recent advancement, and projected advancement to
come, in LAWS technology has sparked an outcry from various
groups who feel the use of such weapons creates new risks in
40. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 30²36.
41. See KALZMANOVITZ, supra note 23, at 149 (arguing that it is possible for
LAWS to be programmed in such a way that they comply with principles of
humanitarian law).
42. Hall, supra note 24, at 90.
43. U.S. DEP’T. DEF., supra note 1.
44. ROBIN GEISS, THE INTERNATIONAL³LAW DIMENSION OF AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS SYSTEMS 25 (2015).
45. Id.
46. See 10 U.S.C. § 125 (2014) (describing the power granted to the Secre-
tary of Defense to abolish military duties).
47. Gary E. Marchant, Braden Allenby, Ronald Arkin & Edward T. Bar-
rett, International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 272, 291²94 (2011).
48. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4.
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warfare.
49
These have been addressed in part by the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly’s Special Rapporteur, suggesting that states de-
velop a code regarding the ethics and use of autonomous weap-
ons.
50
These guidelines, however, have not been universally
adopted, and they lack the legal effect that would be made read-
ily apparent by the existence of a formal treaty.
51
In 2013, the
High Contracting Parties to the CCW established a Group of
Government Experts on LAWS (“Expert Group”), which con-
venes annually to discuss the prospect of restricting LAWS.
52
While the Expert Group affirmed that state responsibility could
be invoked where states use or misuse LAWS, they failed to
agree on a definition of LAWS, the extent to which they cur-
rently exist, or any restrictive measures.
53
II. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE PROHIBITION OF LAWS
Though the subject is only now coming to the forefront of in-
ternational legal debates, LAWS have sparked controversy long
before their implementation became a realistic projection of the
future of combat.
54
The notion that robots should not be created
with the capacity to kill dates back to the 1942 short story,
“Runaround,” in which Isaac Asimov lays out the three laws of
robotics.
55
This Part introduces and discusses some of the most
prominent arguments made for and against the prohibition of
LAWS in armed conflict.
49. NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch and the Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots, contend that using robots in warfare will reduce the threshold for
states to use force. Id. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 13²14.
50. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 7.
51. See The Solution, CAMPAIGN STOP KILLER ROBOTS,
http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/the-solution/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
52. Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2, ¶16 (e).
53. Id.
54. Science fiction works have capitalized on images of “killer robots” for
decades. See e.g., ASIMOV, supra note 3.
55. Id. (“One, a robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction,
allow a human being to come to harm. . . . Two . . . a robot must obey the orders
given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the
First Law. . . . And three, a robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the First or Second Laws.”).
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A. Arguments For the Prohibition of LAWS
LAWS have been criticized almost since their inception.
56
NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch,
57
the International Com-
mittee for Robot Arms Control,
58
and Article 36
59
seek to ban or
strictly limit the development and use of LAWS. Tech industry
leaders and scientists have publicly opposed the use of artificial
intelligence in weapons,
60
and popular media outlet articles have
been highly critical of LAWS, designating them as “Killer Ro-
bots.”
61
Among the most common criticisms advanced against
LAWS are those pertaining to ethical dilemmas, a reduced
threshold for the use of force, a lack of legal accountability, and
the potential for a new arms race.
62
1. Ethics
The predominant objection made by various groups seeking to
limit or prohibit the use of LAWS is that their use would be un-
ethical.
63
The notion that a robot could be endowed with the
power to determine which humans will live and which will die
does not sit well with those who see the potential of being on the
receiving end of this technology.
64
This issue extends beyond the
56. LIN, supra note 1 (criticizing the ethics of implementing LAWS in 2008).
57. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4.
58. Home, INT’L COMM. ROBOT ARMS CONTROL, https://www.icrac.net/ (last
visited Nov. 12, 2018).
59. Autonomous Weapons, ARTICLE 36, http://www.article36.org/issue/au-
tonomous-weapons/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
60. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,
supra note 5.
61. Paul Scharre, Should We Fear Killer Robots?, CNN (Nov. 14, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/opinions/ai-killer-robots-opinion-scharre/in-
dex.html; Ian Sample, Ban on Killer Robots Urgently Needed, Say Scientists,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sci-
ence/2017/nov/13/ban-on-killer-robots-urgently-needed-say-scientists; Killer
Robots: Experts Warn of ¶Third Revolution in Warfare,’ BBC (Aug. 21, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-40995835.
62. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 7; LIN, supra note 1; HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,
supra note 4; Christopher P. Toscano, Friend of Humans: An Argument for De-
veloping Autonomous Weapons Systems, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 189 (2015).
63. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 7; LIN, supra note 1; HUMANRIGHTSWATCH,
supra note 4.
64. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 10. See also Banning Killer Robots in 2017,
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potential for LAWS to violate humanitarian law, but is instead
focused on the broader ethical dilemma: Even if a robot could be
programmed to comply with all humanitarian law, is it ethical
for humans to grant an object which lacks the capacity for com-
passion and moral judgement, the power not only to kill, but to
discern who to kill?
65
While an analysis of the deep philosophical
questions inherent to the relevant ethical issues are beyond the
scope of this paper, it is necessary to discuss briefly the argu-
ments involved to understand the international legal debate sur-
rounding LAWS.
66
Autonomous robots follow a “sense-think-act” paradigm: they
“sense” what is around them through various information gath-
ering sensors; they “think” by assessing the appropriate re-
sponse to any given stimulus; and they “act” in accordance with
that determination.
67
In the future, LAWS will likely have an
increased ability to learn, that is, they will adjust the way that
they think based on their past observations, actions, and stim-
uli.
68
This method of reasoning makes LAWS particularly adept
at making quantitative judgements, but leaves them largely in-
capable of making qualitative judgements.
69
While it may be pos-
sible to program general compliance with IHL, the principle of
proportionality requires consideration of the larger context of a
given situation and the totality of the circumstances.
70
Moreo-
ver, the value of a military objective, which dictates the amount
of permissible collateral damage, is subject to change, in ways
LAWS could not perceive.
71
Some argue that it may be possible for LAWS to undertake
actions consistent with an ethically acting human, despite their
inability to think ethically or to perceive a situation for its full
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 15, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/15/ban-
ning-killer-robots-2017.
65. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 10; LIN, supra note 1.
66. Ethics is a main focus of the argument on LAWS and is at the center
point of any legal system.
67. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 8.
68. See LIN, supra note 1, at 20.
69. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 11.
70. Id. at 13²14.
71. Id. See also U.S. DEP’T. DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR
MANUAL 245 (2015).
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political and ethical context. Ronald Arkin, a roboticist at the
Georgia Institute of Technology, has proposed the use of an “eth-
ical governor”³a framework which would constrain a robot’s ac-
tions to those that are ethical.
72
The ethical governor would re-
quire a LAWS to quantify various criteria to determine if a lethal
attack is legal under IHL, and then, only engage if performing
such an attack would be consistent with operational orders.
73
Furthermore, it is argued by those who advocate for the use of
LAWS that it is more ethical to continue to develop and use
LAWS.
74
In certain circumstances, LAWS are likely to be better
than human soldiers at distinguishing targets,
75
and can reduce
the amount of collateral damage.
76
Therefore, depending on the
way LAWS are used, it would be more ethical to use them and
cause less overall injury to civilians.
77
2. Reduced Threshold For Force
The adoption of LAWS into the arsenals of states would, ac-
cording to some, lower the threshold for using force.
78
It is spec-
ulated that, by using LAWS instead of human soldiers, a state
would have less incentive to refrain from using force.
79
Because
humans tend to be averse to “getting killed, losing their loved
ones, and having to kill other people,” there is typically great
political incentive to avoid war.
80
Where human soldiers can be
replaced with unfeeling machines, states might be more willing
to resort to force.
81
Similar to drones, which have allowed states
to perform operations that they would not have otherwise
72. ARKIN, supra note 19, at 69; HUMANRIGHTSWATCH supra note 4, at 27.
73. ARKIN, supra note 19, at 69; HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 27;
see also LIN, supra note 1, at 35²40 (arguing that it may someday be possible
do create “functional morality”³a program which would mimic the act of a
moral person).
74. See Peter Asaro, How Just Could a Robot War Be?, in CURRENT ISSUES
INCOMPUTING AND PHILOSOPHY 50, 61 (Adam Briggle et al. eds., 2008); see also
KALZMANOVITZ, supra note 23, at 145.
75. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 13.
76. Toscano, supra note 62.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 40.
80. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 11.
81. HUMANRIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 40.
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attempted due to the risk soldiers face, LAWS would permit
states to engage in warfare that otherwise would not occur.
82
In rebutting this claim, LAWS advocates, Jeremy Rabkin and
John Yoo,
83
assert that LAWS could make war less likely.
84
Ac-
cording to Rabkin and Yoo, the decision of whether or not to go
to war is determined by the particular political leader rather
than the types of weapons at his or her disposal.
85
The pair note
that “George W. Bush and Barack Obama had roughly the same
military at their disposal, but they used it very differently.”
86
3. Legal Accountability
The use of devices, which can make their own decisions, raises
issues of legal accountability.
87
Because robots lack moral
agency, they cannot be held accountable for their actions.
88
Where no human is in-the-loop, it seems unfair to hold any indi-
vidual accountable for the actions of LAWS. If, for example, a
weapon autonomously decides to engage in conduct which vio-
lates IHL, neither the programmer of themachine’s software nor
the commander who implemented the device would have in-
tended for the act to occur.
89
While no mechanism for accountability has yet been applied,
it is possible that avenues for a remedy already exist.
90
Although
there has been some resistance to holding the out-of-the-loop
commander responsible for decisions made by the robot, the com-
mander may be the most logical choice, as he or she ultimately
made the decision to use the weapon.
91
It would be difficult to
meet a required mens rea element where the commander could
82. Id. at 39.
83. Jeremy Rabkin and John Yoo are law professors who have publicly ar-
gued in favor of autonomous weapons development. See Rabkin, supra note 8.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 14²15.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Paola Gaeta, Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Alleged Accounta-
bility Gap, in AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING
AUTONOMY IN THE CRITICAL FUNCTIONS OFWEAPONS 47 (2016); but see Rabkin,
supra note 8 (arguing that no accountability gap would actually exist).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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not predict an IHL violation by the machine.
92
Nevertheless, a
remedy may remain under state responsibility, which requires
no mens rea element be satisfied.
93
This notion was affirmed in
the 2017 meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts, who
reported that states are responsible for their use of LAWS and
have a duty to ensure accountability when they use LAWS.
94
4. Arms Race Potential
Both critics and proponents of LAWS have asserted that the
new weapons technology will revolutionize warfare.
95
Some go
as far as to say that the innovation is on par with gunpowder or
nuclear weapons.
96
Those who support banning or at least
tightly restricting LAWS see potential for a new global arms
race, conjuring images of Cold War era tension.
97
Those in favor
of developing LAWS perceive the revolution as a positive devel-
opment.
98
Similar to the way smart bombs have limited the num-
ber of civilian casualties in war, proponents, such as Jeremy
Rabkin and John Yoo, believe the arms revolution that would be
fostered by this technology would “make war less awful.”
99
92. Id.
93. Id. Cf. Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous
Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1402 (2016) (suggesting an entirely new
mechanism for handling civil liability in war crimes that would provide a rem-
edy for wrongful acts conducted by LAWS).
94. Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2, ¶ 16(c) (“Responsibility for the de-
ployment of any weapons system in armed conflict remains with States. States
must ensure accountability for lethal action by any weapon system used by the
State’s forces in armed conflict in accordance with applicable international law,
in particular international humanitarian law. The human element in the use
of lethal force should be further considered”).
95. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,
supra note 5; Alexander Valez-Green, The Foreign Policy Essay: The South Ko-
rean Sentry³A ´Killer Robotµ to Prevent War,
LAWFARE (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-policy-essay-
south-korean-sentry%E2%80%94-killer-robot-prevent-war; Rabkin, supra
note 8.
96. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers,
supra note 5 (“autonomous weapons have been described as the third revolu-
tion in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms”).
97. Id.
98. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 11²12.
99. Rabkin, supra note 8.
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5. Other Vulnerabilities
From the perspective of the states developing LAWS technol-
ogy, it may be difficult to see the negative implications through
the same lens as states that cannot afford the financial burden
of weapons development and envision a future on the receiving
end of LAWS.
100
The truth of the matter is that, if developed,
LAWS will eventually enter into the arsenal of every military
organization, whether that be of state, private militias, or ter-
rorist groups.
101
Critics often ask: what is to happen when a
LAWS falls into the hands of a military force that feels uncon-
strained by any international laws, which might regulate its
use?
102
Rather than being carefully programmed to adhere to hu-
manitarian law, these weapons, when in the wrong hands, could
be used to attack indiscriminately.
103
Furthermore, because
LAWS are mere computers,
104
they may also be vulnerable to
hacking, which would mark a revolution not only in traditional
warfare, but in cyberwarfare as well.
105
B. Arguments Against Prohibiting LAWS
While states on the forefront of LAWS technology have demon-
strated openness towards some form of regulation, these states
have also demonstrated a desire to continue developing LAWS.
This section details some of the most prominent arguments in
favor of autonomous weapons development advanced by states
and scholars who believe the advent of LAWS will be a humane
100. For example, Russia, a state which has begun investing in developing
LAWS technology has encouraged the international community to refrain from
a premature, over restrictive regulatory regime. See Group of Governmental
Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Exam-
ination of Various Dimensions of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, in the Context of the Objectives and Purposes of
the Convention: Submitted by the Russian Federation, CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.8
(Nov. 10, 2017) [hereinafter Russian Federation Governmental Experts Exam-
ination].
101. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 16.
102. HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, supra note 4, at 31.
103. Id.
104. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 18.
105. Id.
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improvement to warfare. These arguments include the ad-
vantages of force protection, reduced emotional influence in the
battlefield, reduction in civilian casualties, and affordability.
1. Force Protection
Force protection is the most obvious advantage of autonomous
weapons systems.
106
Incidental to completing every military ob-
jective is the goal of minimizing one’s own harm in the process.
107
LAWS would allow states to significantly reduce their own risks
while engaging in military activity.
108
Critics of this argument suggest that while this is beneficial to
the LAWS-using state, it shifts the burden onto the civilians in
the location where the LAWS are being used.
109
In traditional
combat, combatants engage in military activities at their own
risk, but in a situation where LAWS are used in the place of hu-
man soldiers, the local civilians in the vicinity of military activ-
ity would be placed at greater risk than the soldiers who deploy
the LAWS.
110
2. Less Emotional Influence
Those who support LAWS suggest that, in addition to being
more expendable than human soldiers, LAWS may also be more
adept at adhering to IHL.
111
While proportionality and distinc-
tion are often questioned, there is little doubt that LAWS will be
more adept than humans in following laws prohibiting certain
acts.
112
A LAWS would be incapable of violating human rights
unless programmed to do so.
113
On the battlefield, soldiers can
become victims of their own emotions and prejudice.
114
A LAWS
106. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 10.
107. See Robin Geiss, The Principle of Proportionality: Force Protection as a
Military Advantage, 45 ISR. L. REV. 71, 90 (2012).
108. Id.
109. See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbi-
trary Executions, supra note 1, at 10.
110. Id. at 16.
111. KALZMANOVITZ, supra note 23, at 145; See Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 1, at 10.
112. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 10; Rabkin, supra note 8.
113. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 10.
114. Id.
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on the other hand, will never be able to become overwhelmed by
emotions in ways that affect its efficiency as a soldier or that
might lead it to commit IHL violations.
115
This argument is ab-
breviated to its simplest form in a comment made by the U.N.
Special Rapporteur: “Robots also do not rape.”
116
3. Fewer Civilian Casualties
Despite claims that LAWS lack the capacity to adequately dis-
tinguish targets and to gauge proportionality, their designed
purpose is, in fact, to reduce collateral damage.
117
Unlike explo-
sives or poisonous gasses, LAWS are intended to be used in
highly populated areas while leaving the civilians unharmed.
118
If allowed to be developed and brought into the battlefield,
properly functioning LAWS would make war safer for civilians
who would otherwise be at risk.
119
4. Cost
Finally, a significant benefit of using LAWS is the cost. The
cost of developing LAWS is high at the moment, with develop-
ment efforts costing states billions of dollars.
120
Once an ade-
quate design is realized, however, it would be relatively inexpen-
sive to manufacture a fleet of LAWS.
121
The cost of manufactur-
ing a human-in-the-loop explosive disposal robot, for example, is
$117,000 USD, while the cost of training an explosive ordinance
disposal technician to perform similar operations would be ap-
proximately $1 million USD.
122
Furthermore, LAWS are signifi-
cantly more expendable than their human counterparts, both
due to their affordability, and the lack of political backlash mil-
itaries would face when loosing mechanical warfighters.
123
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Valez-Green, supra note 95; Rabkin, supra note 8.
118. Toscano, supra note 62, at 202.
119. Id.
120. Toscano, supra note 62, at 189.
121. Liu, supra note 18, at 633; see Toscano, supra note 62, at 246; see also
Rabkin, supra note 8.
122. Toscano, supra note 62, at 202.
123. Asaro, supra note 74, at 58; See also Rabkin, supra note 8. See also
Marchant et al., supra note 47, at 288 (“It’s also about building the capability
to continue to project power with fewer casualties, and to do so because culture
and society are changing to make fatalities, whether soldier or civilian, less
acceptable. . . .”).
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Proponents of LAWS have suggested that implementation of low
cost LAWS would allow greater opportunities to keep civilians,
as well as soldiers, safe.
124
When a soldier takes the time to ad-
equately identify a target, they risk their lives and the state for
which they fight risks the financial and political cost associated
with losing soldiers. A LAWS, however, has no inherent interest
in self-preservation and would cost its implementing govern-
ment relatively little if it were destroyed.
125
It would, therefore,
be able to abstain from using force until a target could be thor-
oughly assessed.
126
The additional time LAWS could spend de-
termining whether and what amount of force is required would
reduce cost to the warfighting state while ensuring that fewer
civilians become victims due to mistaken identity.
127
The low cost and minimized risk LAWS could provide, how-
ever, is considered by critics a negative attribute of these de-
vices.
128
The proliferation of LAWS is almost inevitable among
states because they are expected to become cheap to manufac-
ture.
129
As LAWS become cheaper and more prominent in war-
fare, there is a greater possibility that these weapons could enter
the hands of terrorist groups or other actors who do not bind
themselves to humanitarian laws.
130
III. PAST EFFORTS TO BANWEAPONS
Many debates regarding LAWS remain unresolved.
131
Various
actions by members of the international community point to the
conclusion that although complete prohibition of LAWS would
not be feasible, the dangers presented by this technology will
124. See Marchant et al., supra note 47, at 280; see also Rep. of the Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 1,
at 13.
125. See Toscano, supra note 62.
126. Marchant et al., supra note 47, at 280; Rep. of the Special Rapporteur
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, supra note 1, at 13.
127. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 13.
128. Marchant et al., supra note 47, at 280 (“However, this reduced cost may,
in turn, reduce the rigor with which non-violent alternatives are pursued and
thus encourage unnecessary-and therefore unjust-wars.”).
129. Liu, supra note 18, at 633²34.
130. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 18.
131. See Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2 (acknowledging the need for
further discussion on LAWS).
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nevertheless warrant substantial regulation.
132
As of 2017,
twenty-six states have called for a complete ban of LAWS,
133
though none of these states have made significant investments
in LAWS development.
134
Dozens of states continue delibera-
tions on future restrictions on LAWS, evidencing some global de-
sire to police development and use of LAWS.
135
Other states that
have already made significant investments in LAWS technology,
however, have a significant interest in retaining the ability to
develop and use the weapons.
136
Because there is no clear controlling international law defining
the scope and limitation of their use,
137
a single multilateral
treaty addressing LAWS must be adopted.
138
To determine the
feasibility of implementing a multilateral disarmament treaty,
this Part will discuss past global disarmament efforts targeting
specific weapons.
A. Treaties Banning Specific Weapons
The proposition of banning a particular weapon from the bat-
tlefield is not a novel concept.
139
Since the adoption of the Stras-
bourg Agreement in 1675,
140
states have come together on mul-
tiple occasions to designate certain tools of war as too inhumane
132. SeeMarchant et al., supra note 47.
133. Country Views on Killer Robots, CAMPAIGN STOP KILLER ROBOTS (Nov.
16, 2017), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2013/03/KRC_CountryViews_16Nov2017.pdf.
134. The United States, Russia, the U.K., China, Israel, and Iran have all
begun or expressed interest in developing LAWS, and none have called for a
ban. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, supra note 1, at 9; Toscano, supra note 62; see also Country Views
on Killer Robots, supra note 133.
135. See Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2.
136. Harold C. Hutchison, Russia Says it Will Ignore Any UN Ban of Killer
Robots, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-
will-ignore-un-killer-robot-ban-2017-11.
137. Toscano, supra note 62, at 192.
138. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 46 (calling on all states to
adopt a binding instrument prohibiting the use and development of LAWS).
139. SOLIS, supra note 11, at 732.
140. The Strasburg agreement is the first codified constraint on the use of
poisoned weapons. The agreement prohibited French and German forces from
using poisoned bullets during King Louis XIV’s attempt to assert French con-
trol over Lorraine. Jean Pascal Zanders, International Norms Against Chemi-
cal and Biological Warfare: An Ambiguous Legacy, 8 J. CONFLICT&SEC. L. 391,
394 (2003).
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for the battlefield and have mutually agreed on their prohibi-
tion.
141
These treaties will be useful in determining whether
LAWS would be appropriate weapons to prohibit and the extent
to which their use could be restricted.
142
One of the first widely
accepted multilateral attempts at banning particular weapons
was the 1899 Hague Convention, which prohibited expanding
bullets, asphyxiating and deleterious gases, and projectiles and
explosives launched from balloons.
143
The Hague Convention
sought to “diminish the evils of war so far as military necessities
permit,” and the prohibition of these weapons was a means of
achieving this objective.
144
Later treaties have continued to tar-
get various instruments of warfighting, such as landmines and
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.
145
Some international disarmament agreements are broad in
scope, prohibiting particular uses of weapons rather than the
weapons themselves.
146
Protocol I of the Geneva Convention, for
example, prohibits all weapons that have indiscriminate ef-
fect.
147
While these broad rules restrict states’ use of certain
141. Id.
142. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 24 (analyzing past weapons treaties to
assess the viability of a prohibition on LAWS).
143. Marjorie W. Whiteman, Prohibited Weapons, 10 DIG. INT’LL. 450 (1968).
144. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land pre-
amble, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 539 T.S. 631.
145. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Con-
ventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects (Protocol II), supra note 13; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention]; Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction preamble, Apr. 29, 1997, 1975 U.N.T.S. 45.
146. See Whiteman, supra note 143, at 450²51 (distinguishing general prin-
ciples and rules of war which restrict certain uses of weapons from specific
rules which prohibit a weapons use).
147. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
I) art. 51(4)(b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 609 (“Indiscriminate attacks are
prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are: (a) those which are not directed at a
specific military objective; (b) those which employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) those which em-
ploy a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinc-
tion.”).
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weapons, the agreement permits some degree of flexibility.
148
For example, the use of flamethrowers against human targets is
prohibited under this treaty because it would cause unnecessary
suffering, but states are not barred from keeping and using
flamethrowers in ways that are in accordance with IHL.
149
Cer-
tain weapons, however, are subject to restrictions implemented
by specific disarmament treaties, such as the Ottawa Conven-
tion, which prohibits the use and stockpiling of land mines.
150
Because LAWS, like flamethrowers, are not per se illegal under
the CCW framework, a separate specific treaty targeting LAWS
would be necessary for restricting their use. The question then
becomes whether LAWS are an appropriate subject of a specific
disarmament treaty.
B. What Makes a Weapon a Candidate for Prohibition?
States are free to abstain from using a particular weapon
based on their own unilateral decision. Successful treaties that
ban weapons tend to be predicated, however, on principles of
IHL, the weapon’s mass effect, and the threat a weapon poses to
humanity.
151
The Ottawa Convention, which prohibits the use of
anti-personnel land mines, declares that the agreement to ban
anti-personnel mines is necessary for the protection of civilians,
a key principle of IHL.
152
The Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (en-
acted 1976) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (enacted
1993) both prohibit biological and chemical weapons, declaring
148. See Whiteman, supra note 143, at 450²51 (discussing situations in
which a weapon may be permissible despite general rules restricting its use).
149. SOLIS, supra note 11, at 741²42.
150. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, supra note 14,
art. 1.
151. See Ken Rutherford, The Hague and Ottawa Conventions: A Model for
Future Weapon Ban Regimes?, NONPROLIFERATION REV. 36, 42²43 (1999) (dis-
cussing the significance adherence to principles of IHL, and preserving inter-
national peace had on the adoption of the Hague Conventions and the Ottawa
Convention).
152. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, supra note 14, pre-
amble (“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by
anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly
innocent and defenseless civilians”).
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them to be weapons of mass destruction.
153
These two treaties,
which prohibit chemical and biological weapons, and the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons state that the
agreements are necessary to prevent harm that would result to
all humankind.
154
In addition, though rarely stated in the text
itself, morality has long been a driving force for disarmament
and has played a key role in the prohibition of certain weap-
ons.
155
LAWS, unlike land mines, are designed to be discriminate
weapons, and do not violate IHL per se.
156
The destructive power
of LAWS and the threat that these weapons pose to the world at
large, however, may support the notion that states would bewill-
ing to ban them.
157
Acknowledging the threat posed by certain
extremely destructive weapons, states have agreed to re-
strictions on biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in the
past.
158
States, however, have also demonstrated reluctance to-
wards prohibiting new weapons technologies.
159
During discus-
sions about banning asphyxiating gas during the 1899 Hague
Peace Conference,
160
a U.S. diplomat made the following state-
ment about the weapon:
153. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 145, preamble; Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, supra note 145.
154. Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 145, preamble; Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, supra note 145; Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
155. SOLIS, supra note 11, at 577; ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 8.
156. While land mines are, by their nature, indiscriminate weapons, LAWS
have potential to increase a military’s ability to distinguish lawful target from
unlawful ones. See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Pro-
duction and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, supra
note 14, preamble; Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 10²11.
157. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 145, preamble; Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, supra note 145, preamble (ac-
knowledging weapons’ destructive effect as a reason for their prohibition).
158. See Biological Weapons Convention, supra note 145, preamble; Conven-
tion on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, supra note 145.
159. See, e.g., WILLIAM I. HULL, THE TWO HAGUE CONFERENCES AND THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 88 (1908).
160. The Hague peace conferences were among the first multilateral efforts
to codify limitations on certain aspects of warfighting. See id.
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(i) That no shell emitting such gases is as yet in practical use,
or has undergone adequate experiment; consequently, a vote
taken now would be in ignorance of the facts as to whether the
results would be of a decisive character, or whether injury in
excess of that necessary to attain the end of warfare, the im-
mediate disabling of the enemy, would be inflicted.
(ii) That the reproach of cruelty and perfidy, addressed against
these supposed shells, was equally uttered formally against
firearms and torpedoes, both of which are now employed with-
out scruple. Until we know the effects of such asphyxiating
shells, there was no saying whether they would be more or less
merciful than missiles now permitted.
161
Similar notions have been expressed contemporarily regarding
LAWS. At the November 2017 meeting of the Group of Govern-
mental Experts, representatives of Russia made the following
statement:
According to the Russian Federation, the lack of working sam-
ples of such weapons systems remains the main problem in the
discussion on LAWS. Certainly, there are precedents of reach-
ing international agreements that establish a preventive ban
on prospective types of weapons. However, this can hardly be
considered as an argument for taking preventive prohibitive or
restrictive measures against LAWS being a by far more com-
plex and wide class of weapons of which the current under-
standing of humankind is rather approximate.
162
This shared interest in pursuing LAWS by states, which have
invested in their development, makes it unlikely that they will
be banned, despite the potential for mass destruction and the
questionable moral implications associated with their use.
163
C. Attempts to Ban Nuclear Weapons
If LAWS are to be the revolutionary warfighting technology
anticipated by critics and proponents alike,
164
it is unlikely that
an agreement would be reached on a complete and total ban of
161. Id.
162. Russian Federation Governmental Experts Examination, supra note
100, ¶ 6.
163. Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 6.
164. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers,
supra note 5. Hall, supra note 24, at 88 (referring to LAWS as “game-chang-
ing”); Rabkin, supra note 8.
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the technology in combat.
165
Because the drastic change LAWS
are anticipated to bring to the battlefield has often been analo-
gized to the transformation brought about by nuclear weap-
ons,
166
past attempts at restricting the latter may provide in-
sight into the practicality of restricting LAWS.
Nuclear weapons are powerful, leave behind radiation, and
cause significant civilian casualties.
167
States, however, continue
to possess stockpiles legally.
168
Because states with nuclear ca-
pabilities have a staggering military advantage over those that
do not, there is little incentive for nuclear capable states to dis-
arm.
169
Since the introduction of nuclear weapons, however,
states have gradually acquiesced to limitations on their use and
proliferation.
170
After the first use of a nuclear weapon in 1945,
an arms race began, and states sought to secure nuclear weap-
ons for themselves.
171
As global consciousness grew of the threat
of global destruction posed by nuclear weapons, disarmament ef-
forts became more effective.
172
In 1963, nuclear-capable states
began placing restrictions on testing nuclear weapons.
173
In
1970, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
came into effect, and has significantly prevented nuclear prolif-
eration.
174
Beginning with the 1987 signing of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the United States and the Soviet
Union began bilaterally reducing nuclear arsenals.
175
Since the
165. See ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 10²11.
166. See Stuart Russell, Take a Stand on AI Weapons, 521 NATURE 415, 415
(2015); Crootof, supra note 93, at 1402.
166. Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers,
supra note 5; Rabkin, supra note 8.
167. See Robert S. Norris & Thomas B. Cochran, Nuclear Weapons,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-
weapon (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
168. See Jacob H. Van Rijn, Nuclear Disarmament: Toward Zero, 5 YALE J.
INT’LAFF. 69, 72 (2010).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 70²72.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Oct. 10, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 6964.
174. Id.; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note
154.
175. Van Rijn, supra note 168, at 72; Treaty on Elimination of Intermediate-
Range and Shorter-Range Missiles Between the United States of America and
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Dec. 22,
2017), http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-between-the-
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end of the Cold War, the United States and Russia have contin-
ued to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons.
176
Non-nuclear
states have also continued to strengthen their resolve for a nu-
clear-free world by signing a variety of bilateral and regional dis-
armament agreements,
177
as well as the 2017 Treaty on the Pro-
hibition of Nuclear Weapons.
178
D. Practicality
Complete disarmament of LAWS through a single treaty is un-
likely to occur at this early stage in the development of LAWS.
If LAWS are as revolutionary as commentators anticipate, his-
tory has told us³and Russia has affirmed³that states will con-
tinue to develop the systems as a matter of self-interest.
179
As
with nuclear weapons, however, legal permissibility does not in-
sinuate complete and unrestricted development and use.
180
Just
as nuclear weapons have become gradually restricted over time,
LAWS, even without restrictions beyond IHL norms at the out-
set, would become restricted as well.
181
There is, nevertheless,
no compelling reason why the world must wait for and see the
full extent of damage that may be caused by LAWS before begin-
ning to regulate them.
182
Currently, uncertainty about the fu-
ture of LAWS has been a source of tension among states discuss-
ing them, and has prevented significant agreement on their
united-states-of-america-and-the-union-of-soviet-socialist-republics-on-the-
elimination-of-their-intermediate-range-and-shorter-range-missiles/.
176. Van Rijn, supra note 168, at 72.
177. See, e.g., The African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, opened for
signature April 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698; Latin America Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone Treaty, opened for signature Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281; South Pa-
cific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985,
1445 U.N.T.S. 177.
178. Treaty on the Prohibition of NuclearWeapons, opened for signatureAug.
9, 2017, C.N.476.2017.TREATIES-XXVI.9 (prohibiting state parties from en-
gaging in a wide variety of activities related to nuclear weapons).
179. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 8²9; Russian Federation Governmental Ex-
perts Examination, supra note 100.
180. Though not per se illegal under IHL, use and development of these
weapons are limited by IHL principles and by a growing body of restrictive
regimes. See id.; See also Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226 (July 8).
181. ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 24 (arguing that international norms relat-
ing to LAWS should develop incrementally over time).
182. SeeMarchant et al., supra note 47, at 280.
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regulation.
183
As time continues to pass without an international
consensus on LAWS, states continue to make strides in LAWS
technology.
184
As investments in LAWS increase, states will be-
come less likely to sign a disarmament agreement while the
technology is in its infancy.
185
Therefore, rather than waiting
decades for a piecemeal disarmament strategy, states should im-
mediately adopt a largely permissive agreement to solidify re-
solve to limit the potential harm that LAWS might cause and to
facilitate further restrictions of LAWS as they become neces-
sary.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The advent of LAWS has sparked significant disagreement
among states and experts in the field.
186
The 2017meeting of the
Group of Governmental Experts revealed the extent of this dis-
agreement.
187
States disagree on the potential threat LAWS
pose, and there is no consensus on a universal definition of the
term “LAWS” or on the extent to which LAWS already exist.
188
The significance of LAWS in future warfare, however, is uncon-
troverted.
189
Both those who support and those who oppose
LAWS acknowledge that LAWS will dramatically impact the
warfighting capabilities of those who possess these weapon in
the future.
190
This mutual understanding of potential has been
the catalyst for international dialogue on the future potential
and limitation of LAWS, even by states, such as Russia, who
183. Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2, ¶ 16(e).
184. See ANDERSON, supra note 6, at 24.
185. Id.
186. See Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mousWeapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2, annex II (discussing the current
disagreements among states).
187. Id. (failing to reach significant agreement on international LAWS regu-
lations, but instead resolving to continue discussions in the future).
188. Toscano, supra note 62, at 246; See also Russian Federation Govern-
mental Experts Examination, supra note 100.
189. See Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics Research-
ers, supra note 5 (urging a ban on LAWS due to the significant impact they will
have on warfighting); Cf. ANDERSON, supra note 6 (discussing the significance
of LAWS while suggesting states refrain from banning them).
190. Id.
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oppose LAWS restrictions.
191
Although a complete moratorium
on LAWS at this stage in the technology’s development is neither
practical nor likely to be effective,
192
states have demonstrated
some interest in exploring the possibility of regulating.
193
Inter-
national participation in discussions regarding potential limita-
tions to LAWS development and their use in the future evi-
dences a willingness by states, including those on the forefront
of LAWS development, to define the outermost boundaries for
LAWS. This Part proposes that states adopt a preliminary
agreement setting forth highly permissive guidelines for LAWS
development and implementation, and that the international
community creates a designated international organization
whose primary function is to facilitate further restrictions as in-
ternational consensus on the threat LAWS pose develops.
194
A. Timing
The speed with which a regulatory regime is adopted is critical
to its potential for universal acceptance and effectiveness.
195
As
has been demonstrated by the adoption of CCW Protocol IV,
which prohibits the use of lasers to permanently blind enemy
combatants, a weapons limitation may be effective when
adopted while a weapons technology is in its infancy.
196
The first
prohibition of expanding bullets occurred shortly after their in-
vention, and it has held strong for over a century.
197
On the other
hand, nuclear weapons, which were permitted to proliferate and
develop without significant regulation for decades following
their conception, have proven to be extremely difficult to
191. Russian Federation Governmental Experts Examination, supra note
100 (discussing Russia’s interest in continued dialogue despite a desire to con-
tinue research and development of LAWS).
192. Toscano, supra note 62, at 243²44; ANDERSON, supra note 6.
193. See Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2.
194. Cf. Marchant et al., supra note 47 (suggesting, among other solutions,
that a framework convention as well as “trans governmental dialogue.”).
195. Id.
196. SOLIS, supra note 11, at 743²45.
197. See Alfons Vanheusden, W. Hays Parks & William H. Boothby, The Use
of Expanding Bullets in Military Operations: Examining the Kampala Consen-
sus, 50 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 535, 537²38 (2011) (discussing the history of
expanding bullet restrictions).
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restrict.
198
Land mines, though less massively devastating, have
similarly taken decades to restrict in a significant way.
199
Although a sooner-rather-than-later approach of regulation
may have been preferable in the development and implementa-
tion of nuclear weapons and land mines, premature over-re-
striction presents its own threats.
200
Past prohibitions on
weaponized submarines and aircrafts have eroded over time as
the weapons becamemore widely accepted and understood.
201
As
those weapons developed and evolved incrementally, so too did
the norms and principles guiding their legal use.
202
Rather than
adopting complete restriction of LAWS while the technology is
only just being introduced, a regulatory regime should recognize
that future understanding of the weapons technology will aid in
its restriction. Acting now to adopt a framework for a regulatory
regime and defining only the most agreeable limitations to the
use and development of LAWS would minimize the risk of the
limitations falling to the wayside and help expedite the applica-
tion of future restrictions.
B. Defining Agreeable Boundaries
To be agreeable to states that have demonstrated an interest
in pursuing LAWS technology and have opposed strict regula-
tion and prohibition, the framework agreement should avoid at-
tempting to find solutions for the immediate sources of conten-
tion.
203
Instead, the agreement should resolve to find solutions
in the future as understanding of LAWS on the battlefield be-
comes more concrete.
204
The framework agreement should re-
frain from formally adopting a definition for LAWS. States
should instead apply any agreed upon terms to systems that
would fall within the broadest definition and resolve to adopt a
universally acceptable definition in the future. Similarly, the
agreement should refrain from designating the amount of
198. See Van Rijn, supra note 168 (summarizing the decades-long attempts
to restrict nuclear weapons).
199. See SOLIS, supra note 11, at 736²41 (tracking the development of land
mine restrictions from their first use in the U.S. Civil War through the 1997
Ottawa Convention).
200. ANDERSON, supra note 6.
201. Id. at 8²9.
202. Id.
203. Cf. id.
204. Cf. id.
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human control required by weapons system, and instead should
resolve to find an answer to this question through continued in-
ternational cooperation and dialogue between those states wish-
ing to prohibit LAWS and those that wish to explore their poten-
tial.
Furthermore, to facilitate the continued dialogue about LAWS,
an independent international organization should be created.
This organization would provide states and NGOs the oppor-
tunity to meet regularly, to discuss challenges, and to resolve
disagreements pertaining to LAWS. A similar function is cur-
rently being performed by the CCW Expert Group on an ad hoc
basis.
205
While the Expert Group has been valuable in facilitat-
ing international dialogue on LAWS,
206
an independent organi-
zation would allow for the constant development of legal under-
standing and movement towards a restrictive regime. Similar
organizations, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty Organization (CTBTO), have performed comparable
functions in implementing weapons restricting treaties.
207
Like
the OPCW and the CTBTO, a new organization dedicated to reg-
ulating and restricting LAWS would permit continued dialogue,
facilitate international cooperation, and help states protect
themselves against aggressive use of LAWS.
208
CONCLUSION
Autonomous weapons are almost certainly going to be part of
the future of warfare and are poised to drastically change the
205. In compliance with their ability to “agree by consensus on recommenda-
tions for further work for consideration,” the Expert Group has informal meet-
ings, which have been held annually since 2014. Meeting of the High Contract-
ing Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Cer-
tain ConventionalWeaponsWhichMay Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Final Rep. ¶ 35 CCW/MSP/2015/9 (Jan. 27,
2016).
206. See Rep. of the 2017 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autono-
mous Weapons Systems (LAWS), supra note 2.
207. These organizations facilitate the object and purpose of their respective
treaties while providing a forum for member states to participate in their ap-
plication. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, supra note
145, art. VIII; Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art. II, Sept. 24, 1996,
35 I.L.M. 1439.
208. Cf. OPCW Mission Statement, ORG. PROHIBITION CHEMICAL WEAPONS,
https://www.opcw.org/about-opcw/mission/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2018).
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ways in which wars are fought.
209
The inability to reach consen-
sus on the potential benefits or harms LAWS stand to bring
about ensures that states that have already invested resources
in developing LAWS technology will likely continue to do so.
210
Although the potential power of LAWS might make them a sig-
nificant global threat on par with weapons of mass destruc-
tion,
211
these weapons are unlikely to be completely banned so
long as states continue to have an interest in exploring the tech-
nology. While LAWS technology is in its infancy, however, a
framework could be established through a new international or-
ganization committed to reducing the harmful effects caused by
LAWS, whereby the international community would be able to
expedite restrictions on LAWS as consensus on their dangers de-
velops.
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